Leaked documents place Sudan’s army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan at the heart of a secret chlorine munitions programme. As his generals manufactured and deployed chemical weapons, al-Burhan watched — and then ordered the traces erased. This CHRAPA report exposes the full scope of the programme, its victims, and the international failure to hold the Sudanese military to account.
Published by CHRAPA • Centre for Human Rights & Peace Advocacy
Featured image — Al-Burhan watches through a telescope as his Army Generals manufacture chemical weapons. The infographic panel documents the scale of the chlorine munitions programme and its Sudanese victims. (Editorial illustration)
Executive Summary
The civil war in Sudan, which began on April 15, 2023, has become one of the deadliest and most devastating conflicts of the 21st century. More than 150,000 people have been killed, over 13.4 million displaced, and the country faces what the World Health Organization calls the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. At the heart of this catastrophe lies a secret that has now been exposed: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) allegedly developed, tested, and deployed chlorine-based chemical weapons against civilians and combatants alike — a programme that intercepted communications suggest reached the direct knowledge of army commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan himself. [7]
This CHRAPA report presents evidence from leaked confidential documents, independent investigations by The Washington Post and The New York Times, and the escalating international response. The United States has formally determined that Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024 and imposed multiple rounds of sanctions. The European Union has aligned its restrictive measures with UN Security Council determinations and raised concerns at the OPCW Executive Council. Yet independent verification remains blocked by Khartoum, and accountability mechanisms have failed to keep pace with the scale of the atrocities.
Sources: The New York Times, The Washington Post, France 24, BBC News. [11][13]
The Leaked Documents: A Secret Chemical Weapons Programme
On September 5, 2026, The Washington Post and The New York Times published two separate investigations based on files, correspondence, and internal materials that, for the first time, draw a detailed picture of an alleged secret programme within the Sudanese army to manufacture, test, and store munitions loaded with chlorine, and to use some of them in the war before later moves to remove traces that could lead back to it. [1] The published documents go further than Washington’s previous accusations, discussing the structure of an alleged programme, hundreds of munitions, manufacturing, storage, and testing sites, officers linked to the project, and communications that one of the two newspapers says reach army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan himself. [2]
The Washington Post obtained documents, video clips, messages, and internal materials from security officials in the Middle East, revealing a secret stockpile of chlorine bombs, production sites, desert tests, and lists of potential targets, in addition to later efforts to conceal traces of the programme. The files indicate the existence of up to 290 chemical munitions, while a conversation dating back to late 2024 reported that hundreds of bombs were stored at Merowe Air Base and that 106 of them were used. [3]
The New York Times revealed a file containing about 150 documents, photos, video clips, and a voice message, in addition to thousands of text messages, most of them extracted from the phones of senior Sudanese military officials. The materials describe a process spanning about six months during 2024 to develop and produce chemical munitions, with a project that began in July to develop a chlorine-based munition tested from an “Antonov An-32” aircraft in the Merowe area, described as having succeeded “100 percent.” [4][5] Messages following the test spoke of its success while emphasizing keeping the project in “complete secrecy.”
By October 2024, the materials indicate the production of about 300 chemical munitions, most stored at Merowe. One document describes a munition carrying about 15 kilograms of gas and 20 kilograms of explosives, while another indicates that the development of a new design aimed to conceal evidence of chemical use. [6]
“The previous American accusation has, for the first time, become surrounded by public details about an alleged manufacturing mechanism, a stockpile, testing locations, correspondence, names, and alleged efforts to erase traces.”
— CHRAPA analysis of leaked documents, September 2026 [10]
Sources: The New York Times, The Washington Post, September 2026. [3][6]
Al-Burhan’s Role: Watching, Knowing, and Covering Up
The most explosive element of the leaked documents is the direct link to al-Burhan. The New York Times says that intercepted voice and text communications, some of which included contact with al-Burhan, indicate his direct knowledge of the alleged project. It also discusses subsequent instructions attributed to him to remove traces of the activities after the American sanctions. [7] The question, as one analysis noted, is no longer only whether a chemical weapon was used, but who knew, when they knew, and what decisions were taken afterward.
This detail intersects with what The Washington Post published about a message dating back to September 2025, which officials said was intended to reassure al-Burhan that a base where the weapons had been stored had been cleared of “traces and remnants.” [7] After the United States imposed sanctions over Sudan’s alleged chemical weapons use, intercepted communications indicate efforts were made to remove traces of the programme — with instructions attributed directly to the army commander.
The file opens another avenue related to the source of the chlorine, as the materials indicate the use of a substance originally available for civilian purposes, particularly drinking water treatment. [8] The Washington Post discusses different accounts of the source, including a shipment of 20 chlorine tanks said to have arrived via Egypt, and cylinders linked to water treatment plants. According to one account, the quantity arriving via Egypt was theoretically sufficient to produce about 1,100 bombs. [8] This diversion of a civilian water purification chemical into a weapon of war represents a particularly insidious dimension of the programme — one that punishes the very population the chemical was meant to protect. France 24 documented how chlorine imported to Sudan for water purification ended up being used as a poison gas, tracing the barrels to an Indian company that exported them to Port Sudan in August 2024. [12]
The Sudanese army rejected the accusations, citing Sudan’s membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention since 1999. Al-Burhan formed a committee to investigate, which concluded that no chemical or radioactive contamination was found. [9] However, the United States formally determined in April 2025 that the Government of Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024 and remained in non-compliance with the CWC in 2025. [21]
The Human Cost: Sudanese Killed and Affected by Chemical Weapons
While no comprehensive death toll has been confirmed, evidence of chlorine attacks and their devastating impact on Sudanese civilians is mounting. On September 5 and 13, 2024, barrels containing chlorine gas were dropped from the air near the al-Jaili refinery north of Khartoum. Footage shared on September 13 showed at least six men — some wearing refinery uniforms — receiving oxygen treatment. [13] An engineer at the refinery reported that several victims were hospitalised in critical condition and that some died after the incident, though The Observers team was unable to independently confirm the deaths. [13]
A witness interviewed by The National described the aftermath of a chemical attack: “It was only two days later that I learnt that the area where I saw the men was contaminated and that a large number of people were affected. Later, I learnt from a relative that two civilians died while being treated in hospital because of the contamination.” [15] Human Rights Watch confirmed that exposure to chlorine can lead to symptoms from reddening and itchiness to shortness of breath and even death, and that its use as a weapon constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute. [14]
Beyond the immediate casualties, the weaponisation of chlorine has had cascading humanitarian consequences. Nearly 17.3 million people lack access to safe drinking water in Sudan. [12] The diversion of chlorine — imported for water purification — into chemical weapons has compounded the crisis: a single barrel of chlorine, like those dropped near al-Jaili, could have produced around 240 million litres of potable water, enough to cover the basic needs of one million displaced persons for three months. [22] Instead, the collapse of water and sanitation systems has fuelled a cholera outbreak, with 2,700 people — including 500 children — falling ill in White Nile state alone between January and February 2025. [22]
Sources: France 24, The National, Human Rights Watch, UNICEF. [12][14][15]
Sanctions and the Accountability Gap
The United States has led the sanctions response. After determining in April 2025 that Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024, Washington imposed sanctions restricting Sudan’s access to US financing and exports and banning state-owned Sudanese airlines from using American airspace. [16] On June 23, 2026, the US decided to apply additional measures because Sudan had not satisfied statutory requirements to avoid them, with the measures taking effect on July 20, 2026. [21]
The leaked documents may change the dynamics. As the CHRAPA analysis notes, this shift may increase pressure on Khartoum and open the way for additional sanctions targeting individuals or entities linked to the alleged programme, if Washington or other international parties adopt what the documents reveal or if it is reinforced by independent evidence. [10] The likelihood of pressure increases the more the other path demanded by Washington stalls: Sudan’s cooperation with the OPCW and allowing independent verification.
Washington demands that Sudan cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and allow verification of the sites, facilities, and suspected munitions. If the file remains closed to verification while evidence and correspondence continue to emerge, the leaks could shift from a political reputation problem into an accountability and sanctions file targeting individuals and institutions within the Sudanese army establishment. [10]
The National editorialised in September 2026 that “the international response to these reports, and indeed the dossier, has been inadequate,” calling for inspectors to be given access to suspected sites and for the UN Security Council to expand the arms embargo imposed on Darfur to cover the entire country. [17]
International Sanctions on Sudan: A Comparison
